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In 2007, Viacom sued YouTube for direct and secondary copyright infringement 
requesting damages in the amount of over 1 billion dollars. Later on the court 
joined a related action by the Football Association Premier League and various 
film studios, television networks and music publishers, turning it into a mas-
sive class action against one of the most popular web sites in the world. In the 
United States, these types of web sites generally fall within one of the judiciary 
or legislatively created safe harbors. The District Court decided that YouTube 
falls within a safe harbor, so Viacom appealed. The decision of the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was rendered on April 5, 2012. Although remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings, there are indications that YouTube 
will not be granted safe harbor protection. Some strategies an online service 
provider can implement to acquire safe harbor protection can be reexamined in 
light of this decision and the existing case law. After a general introduction to 
the indirect copyright infringement in the United States law and the facts of the 
Viacom v. YouTube litigation, some recommendations for online service provid-
ers have been offered. 
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Introduction
The last decade has been marked by the explosion of different interactive content 
on the Internet – online service providers such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter and 
Dropbox have successfully grown from small startups to corporations worth bil-
lions in just a couple of years (or sometimes even less). On October 4th 2012 Marck 
Zuckerberg has announced that more than one billion people are actively using Fa-
cebook. The global impact of these web contents is tremendous. From the legal 
perspective this trend creates a number of problems and opens to many questions to 
be answered in the pace they are occurring. 
The most important issue for the traditional media giants – tv networks, film stu-
dios, music publishers etc. – are the various possibilities of copyright infringement 
with the help of the new technological tools. Digital age enabled copying of copy-
righted works by almost anyone and almost free; Internet enabled fast and free 
distribution of that content.
Since most of the online service providers, as well as the largest media industries 
are situated in the United States, American copyright law needed to adapt to the 
new trends faster than other legal systems. In 1998 the Online Copyright Infringe-
ment Liability Limitation Act incorporated as Title II of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA) limited the liability of OSPs and provided the so-called 
“safe harbors”. By complying with a set of conditions, an OSP can qualify for a 
“safe harbor” and be exempted for liability for copyright infringement. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals recently discussed one of the DMCA safe harbors provi-
sion in connection to claims of direct and secondary copyright infringement against 
YouTube. The decision was rendered on April 5, 2012. Although remanded to the 
District Court for further proceedings, some strategies an online service provider 
can implement to acquire safe harbor protection can be reexamined in light of this 
decision and the existing case law. 
Indirect liability for copyright infringement in the law of the United States, with the 
emphasis on the liability of OSPs for the infringements committed by its users, is 
discussed in the first part of this paper. DMCA safe harbors are in the focus of the 
second part of the paper. The decision in Viacom v. YouTube rendered on April 5, 
2012 is presented in the third part of the paper. Finally, some practical guidelines 
on the current state of the law when it comes to legal business operations of the 
online service providers have been offered.
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I Indirect Copyright Infringement 
YouTube was founded in February 2005 by three former employees of Paypal and 
launched under the slogan “Broadcast yourself” (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:628).1 
In November 2006, Google bought YouTube for 1.65 billion dollars. By March 
2010, YouTube has grown to more then 1 billion daily video views and more then 
24 hours of new video material uploaded every minute. This would without a doubt 
be a story of an admirable business success hadn’t various research show that be-
tween 60 and 80 percent of that material is infringing.2 The one billion dollar ques-
tion3 is: is YouTube liable for copyright infringements committed by the users of its 
services?
Professors Lichtman and Landes (2003:395) explain the indirect liability for copy-
right infringement on the example of a flea market where sellers sell unauthorized 
recordings of copyrighted music. The direct liability of the sellers is undisputed. 
Indirect liability of the owner of the flea market is a more difficult question because 
even though the owner of the flea market only provided a platform for interaction 
of sellers and buyers, he did benefit from the infringement that occurred on that 
platform. 
Copyright infringers – the persons who made the unauthorized recordings of copy-
righted music – would be held liable before any court under the rules for direct 
liability for the wrong doing. Third persons – the owners of the flea market – can 
only be liable if the legal system of the court recognizes indirect liability and will 
depend on the rules on indirect liability of the particular legal system4 and on how 
the courts apply those rules.
Contributory Infringement, Vicarious Infringement and the Inducement 
theory
The United States 1976 Copyright Act expressly recognizes only direct liability 
for copyright infringement, however courts in the United States have held that a 
person can be liable for the infringing acts of another. They have extended two 
theories generated from tort law to copyright infringement cases – contributory in-
fringement and vicarious liability (Leaffer, 2005:426). Contributory infringement 
is described as a situation where the third party knowingly5 causes, induces or in 
another manner contributes to the infringing conduct.6 A third party can be found 
vicariously liable if it has control over the infringer and has a direct financial ben-
efit from the infringing activity. (Leaffer, 2005:431)
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Thus, returning to the above-mentioned example, in the United States, the flea mar-
ket owners can be held liable. In fact, in Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction. Inc., a 
case with a similar factual background, an operator of a flea market was held vi-
cariously liable for the sale of infringing goods on the premises of his flea market 
(Leaffer, 2005:432). 
An analogy can be drawn between a flea market owner and an Online Service Pro-
vider (OSP). Same as flea market owners, OSPs provide space for the activities of 
its users. There are various definitions of what constitutes an OSP. An easily under-
standable definition is that a web site is an OSP “if it does not substantially alter the 
material provided by its user” (Hormann,2009:1351).7 Courts have held that web 
sites like YouTube8 or eBay9, as well as the file sharing sites like Napster or Aim-
ster10, fit the description of an OSP. So is it possible to hold the OSP liable for the 
infringing activities conducted by its users without its knowledge? Is it the same as 
holding a flea market owner responsible for the activities conducted by the sellers 
of unauthorized copies of copyrighted works on his market?
The first case where the Supreme Court limited the indirect liability for copyright 
infringement in the name of new technology was Universal City Studio v. Sony 
Corp. of Am. The famous litigation started when Sony invented Betamax, which al-
lowed consumers to record movies and television shows of the air, and Hollywood 
panicked (Leary, 2012:1136). Copyright holder’s legal claim was that the new 
equipment enables viewers to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted television 
programs. But what was really troubling them was that viewers were suddenly able 
to skip commercials, which lowers the value of the program (Lichtman & Landes, 
2003:395). The court, however, found that, because Betamax was suitable for sub-
stantial non-infringing use (which the court identified as time-shifting)11, Sony was 
not liable for copyright infringement. Commentators and scholars agree that the 
decision had much more to do with economics then it did with law.12 This was the 
way for the court to protect the existing copying technology and ensure the ongo-
ing development of new copying technology. The consequence of the Sony deci-
sion was extremely important for producers and sellers of new technologies, and 
later on for the OSPs. That decision limited their indirect liability and in opinion of 
many enabled the unrestrained development of new technologies.13
After Sony, it was clear that, in order for the technology producer or the service 
provider to escape liability, the equipment or the service in question must be capa-
ble of both infringing and non-infringing use, and that the non-infringing use must 
be substantial. The question continued to be relevant for indirect liability of the 
OSPs. 
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In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. the court held Grokster, a 
peer-to-peer file sharing site notorious for the sharing of copyrighted music, liable 
for the infringing activity of its users based on the inducement theory, i.e. the court 
held that Grokster is liable for copyright infringement because it encouraged its 
users to share unauthorized copies of copyrighted works.14 The court preserved the 
objective standard developed in Sony by acknowledging the fact that the web site 
is capable of both infringing and non infringing use, but it based its decision on 
the subjective standard making the culpable intent to encourage copyright infringe-
ment the core of the new inducement theory. 
Although the Grokster rule is to some extent vague15 the intention of the court was 
clear – to limit the freedom it has given to the technology developers in Sony by 
basically making a distinction between the good guys (the ones who play by the 
rules of good faith) and the bad guys (the ones who do not).16 In other words, the 
focus switched from technology to producers of technology, making the legality 
and prudency of their business model the center of the decision making process. 
This new idea is a good demonstration of the cyclical dance the court plays to find 
the balance between the technology developers and the copyright holders.17
II Safe Harbors Under the DMCA 
The Sony ruling can be understood as a first, court-made, safe harbor for indirect li-
ability of the producers of new technologies. However, it became clear that the safe 
harbor provided by the court in Sony will not be enough for the different kind of 
service providers when Internet exploded at the beginning of the nineties.18At that 
time, the fast growing number of OSPs, at the beginning, in particular, the file shar-
ing web sites, caused a series of litigations. Firstly, because the OSPs were mas-
sively used for sharing, uploading and viewing unauthorized copies of copyrighted 
works. Secondly, because the number of direct infringers made it difficult, if not 
impossible, to hold them liable. 
Legislative solution to the problem of OSPs indirect liability came in the form of 
1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which have been said to have saved the 
Web (Leary, 2012:1138).19 The idea behind the act was to motivate copyright hold-
ers and service providers to cooperate. There are two major goals DMCA tried to 
achieve. First one benefits the OSPs, and thus promotes online innovation, by lim-
iting the OSPs liability through a series of the so-called safe harbor provisions. 
The second goal is to protect copyright holders by banning circumvention of any 
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technological measures that are intended to protect copyrighted works. (Hormann, 
2009:1351)
It should be noted that compliance with the DMCA requirements is only optional 
for an OSP. If an OSP does not comply or does not wish to comply with the general 
requirements to fall within the DMCA, and the specific requirements to fall within 
one of the four safe harbors, its liability will be determined by the application of the 
general rules on the liability of copyright infringers.20
In order to qualify for either one of the safe harbors, the OSP must meet several 
general conditions. 
Firstly, the OSP must fall within the DMCA definition of a service provider.21 Stat-
utory definition of a service provider is very broad, and as noted above it has been 
interpreted broadly by the courts which qualified file sharing sites, search engines, 
social networks, and many other types of web sites as OSPs for the purposes of ap-
plication of DMCA.
Further, the OSP must adapt a termination policy for the repeat infringers, inform 
its users of the policy and reasonably implement the policy. The first two condi-
tions are very easy to follow and most of the OSPs do it diligently. For example, 
YouTube’s termination policy is published on the site and it closely copies the lan-
guage of DMCA.22 The more challenging question is what does it mean to “reason-
ably implement” the repeat infringer policy. Although there was some case law 
in which the court discussed the application of the phrase “reasonable implemen-
tation” and thus some guidelines exist, Ballon suggests that the threshold should 
be determined by the courts in case-to-case basis depending on the particular cir-
cumstances of each case (2009:666). YouTube, for example claims that it has an 
automated system that identifies repeat infringers and terminates their accounts. 
However, even in the case of such diligent implementation of termination policy, 
the termination policy might still be largely ineffective and the goals behind the 
policy can easily be circumvented (Darrow & Ferrera, 2007:15,16). For example, 
websites like YouTube cannot prevent the account holder whose account has been 
terminated to sign up for a new account under new name, which allows repeat in-
fringers to get back in the game within minutes.
Finally, as a precondition to be eligible for the safe harbor protection, an OSP must 
have adopted standard technical measures used by copyright owners to identify and 
protect copyrighted works. DMCA expressly states that the OSP does not need to 
monitor or affirmatively seek infringing activity on its websites.23 The burden of 
finding copyright infringements is entirely on the copyright holders. OSP’s only 
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duty is to implement the standard technical measures that facilitate copyright hold-
ers’ search.
In case the OSP satisfied the general requirements, the DMCA limits the potential 
liability of an online service provider in four activities: a) “transitory digital net-
work communications”; b) “system caching”; c) “information residing on systems 
or networks at the direction of users”; and d) “information location tools”. 24 If an 
OSP fulfills a set of requirements attached to a particular activity, the activity will 
fall within the safe harbor and the OSP will be exempted from liability (Laeffer, 
2005:433).
The most beneficial safe harbor for OSPs and the most often used one is the §512(c) 
safe harbor, which limits the liability of the OSPs in case the infringing material 
was stored by a user (Ballon, 2009:653). In Viacom v. YouTube, YouTube claims to 
be protected by the §512(c) safe harbor, and thus the focus in this paper will further 
be directed to certain problems within the provision examined by the court in the 
decision rendered on April 5, 2012.
The §512(c) safe harbor: “information residing on systems or networks at the di-
rection of users”
Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) §512(c) an Online Service 
Provider (OSP) is shielded from liability for infringements that occur “by reason of 
the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.”25
In addition to adoption and implementation of a “repeat infringer” policy and the 
accommodation of “standard technical measures” that allow a copyright owner to 
identify infringements,26 to qualify for protection under the DMCA §512(c) safe 
harbor, the OSP must show that it expeditiously removes infringing material upon a 
receipt of a takedown notice from a copyright owner. When copyright owners iden-
tify an infringing activity they can notify the OSP about the specific copyrighted 
work in writing which will trigger the OSPs obligation to promptly remove the 
infringing material. The takedown notice is a “user-friendly” system and has been 
extensively and frequently used by copyright owners.27 But, it has also been criti-
cized – mostly for two reasons (Black, 2011:768): first, the possibilities of abuse of 
the system by the copyright holders, which often use the takedown notice to target 
competitors28; second, copyright holders often require the takedown of work that 
is not infringing due to the fair use doctrine judicially created in the United States, 
which under certain circumstances allows the use of copyrighted work without the 
consent of the copyright holder.29
12
Medij. istraž. (god. 18, br. 2) 2012. (5-20)
Finally, specific conditions for the application of the DMCA §512(c) safe harbor 
are that the OSP “does not have actual knowledge” of the infringing activity, that 
“it is not aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is appar-
ent” (red flag provision) and that it “does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the 
right and ability to control such activity.”30 
All of these conditions have been discussed in the Viacom v. YouTube decision. The 
court presented some interesting ideas on the interpretation of these provisions. Some 
of them are in line with the current practice, but some of them differ significantly. 
III. Current State of Law After the Viacom v. YouTube Decision from 
April 5, 2012
Viacom is an American media conglomerate and as of 2010 the fourth largest 
media conglomerate in the world. After a dispute over the presence of Viacom’s 
copyrighted material on YouTube, on March 13, 2007 Viacom filed a suit against 
YouTube alleging direct and secondary infringements. The Football Association 
Premier League and various film studios, television networks, music publishers 
started a class action31 against YouTube also claiming direct and secondary infringe-
ments. The court decided the two actions are related and the court is now deciding 
on the “direct and secondary copyright infringement based on the public perform-
ance, display and reproduction of approximately 79,000 audiovisual “clips” that 
appeared on YouTube website between 2005 and 2008.” Shortly after, the parties 
jointly moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to decide on the ap-
plicability of the DMCA §512(c) safe harbor. If the court decides YouTube falls 
within the safe harbor, it will be exempted from liability for the alleged copyright 
infringements. 
District Court held that YouTube is entitled to the DMCA safe harbor, but the plain-
tiffs appealed and the decision on the appeal was rendered by the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit on April 5, 2012. The court affirmed the decision in part, vacated 
in part and remanded to the District Court for a new decision with a set of detailed 
instructions of what the court’s interpretation of the DMCA §512(c) safe harbor.
The court held: “Although the District Court correctly held that the §512(c) safe 
harbor requires knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity, we vacate 
the order granting summary judgment because a reasonable jury could find that 
YouTube had actual knowledge or awareness of specific infringing activity on its 
website. We further hold that the District Court erred by interpreting “the right and 
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ability” infringing activity to require “item-specific” knowledge. Finally, we affirm 
the District Court’s holding that the three of the challenged YouTube software func-
tions fall within the safe harbor for infringement that occurs “by reason of” storage 
at the direction of the user, and remanded for further fact finding with respect to a 
fourth software function.” (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:19) 
Lessons for the Online Service Providers from the recent Viacom v. YouTube Deci-
sion 
The decision leaves the current state of law, when it comes to indirect liability for 
copyright infringement, in this position: 
1. An OSP is not protected under the safe harbor only if it has knowledge or aware-
ness of a specific and identifiable infringing activity (and does not remove the ma-
terial expeditiously). 
The 2nd Circuit confirmed an interpretation used by other courts32: that both the 
actual knowledge provision and the red flag provision require the same degree of 
specificity, and that general knowledge of infringing activities does not render an 
OSP ineligible for immunity under the safe harbor (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:30). 
Specifically, “the red flag provision turns on whether the provider was subjectively 
aware of facts that would have made the specific infringement “objectively” obvi-
ous to a reasonable person.” (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:31)
However, the court remanded to District Court because it found that there are evi-
dence that YouTube had actual knowledge of the infringing material. In support the 
court listed internal emails between the founders of YouTube which demonstrate 
their awareness about some unauthorized copyrighted clips and their hesitance to 
remove that material because of its popularity.33 
Knowledge or awareness of material that is only possibly infringing will not be 
enough to disqualify the OSP from protection. The evaluation of evidence in Viacom 
indicates that OSP’s perception of the specific activity as illegal is relevant. (Viacom 
v. YouTube, 2012:31) E.g., informal information of an infringing video, not taken 
down, will not render the OSP liable if the OSP did not perceive it as infringing, but 
ignoring it might trigger the willful blindness doctrine as explained below.
2. An OSP is not protected under the safe harbor if it is willfully blind.
An OSP does not have an affirmative duty to monitor activity on its site, but it is 
not allowed to deliberately shield itself from learning about an infringing activity. 
(Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:35)
The Court supported its reasoning with two relevant cases. In Aimster, the Court 
found that an OSP was willfully blind because it used “encryption to shield itself 
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from the actual knowledge of the unlawful purposes for which the service was be-
ing used.” (In re Aimster Copyright Litig., (2003:651). In Tiffany, eBay had general 
knowledge of counterfeit sales, but the Court found that it was not willfully blind 
since it did not ignore the information about them. (Tiffany v. eBay, 2010:110)
3. An OSP is not protected under the safe harbor if it substantially influences its 
users’ activities.
According to the 9th Circuit, the OSP “must be aware of the specific infringing ma-
terial to have the ability to control that infringing activity.” (UMG Recordings, Inc. 
v. Shelter Capital Partners 2011:1042). The 2nd Circuit Court rejected that interpre-
tation with the explanation that this would render this provision duplicative with 
the “specific knowledge or awareness” provision. (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:36)
However, the 2nd Circuit supported the understanding of the 9th Circuit that the 
“right and ability to control” provision cannot be interpreted as a mere codification 
of the common law doctrine of vicarious liability. (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:37; 
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners 2011:1043). The Court reasoned 
that the DMCA “right and ability to control” requires something more than the 
common law vicarious liability standard, i.e. more than just an ability to remove or 
block access to infringing material. Viacom, 2012 WL at *13.
The 2nd Circuit suggested that the appropriate test for the “right and ability to con-
trol” is whether an OSP is “exerting substantial influence on the activities of users, 
without necessarily – or even frequently – acquiring knowledge of specific infring-
ing activity.” Id. The Court gives two examples that might meet the test. First, in 
Perfect 10 v. Cybernet, Cybernet had the ability to control within the meaning of 
the DMCA because of a monitoring program that allowed it to control the users’ 
activity and extensively influence the content. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, 
Inc., 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Second, the inducement theory, 
as applied by the Supreme Court in Grokster, under which an OSP that promotes 
or encourages infringing activity would be liable for infringement, might also meet 
the proposed test. Viacom, 2012 WL at *13; MGM Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 
913, 936 (2005).
3. An OSP is not protected under the safe harbor if it syndicates selected material 
to a third party.
The 2nd Circuit confirmed that “the conversion (or “transcoding”) of videos into a 
standard display format, the playback of videos on “watch” pages, and the “related 
videos” function” fall within the safe harbor. Viacom, 2012 WL at *14. It expressed 
concerns regarding “the manual selection of copyrighted material for licensing to a 
third party.” Id. at *15. 
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Recommendation for the OSPs
In addition to expeditious removal of infringing material upon a takedown notice, 
and a strict, rigidly applied “repeat infringer” policy, an OSP should consider the 
following strategies:
While there is no duty to affirmatively investigate or monitor infringing content, 
when an OSP receives information about specific infringing material, it should in-
vestigate, and if it finds the material infringing, take it down. This would shield the 
OSP from both the red flag provision and the willful blindness as interpreted in Tif-
fany. More importantly, to avoid liability under the willful blindness doctrine, the 
OSP must refrain from using encryption that would disable it, or copyright owners, 
to track down infringing material. 
The OSP should not substantially influence the users’ activities, monitor or edit 
the content or encourage or promote infringing activity. The 2nd Circuit expressed 
concerns about transfer of selected material to third party. In the case of a third-
party syndication agreement, OSP should not edit or chose the content that will be 
transmitted to third party.
An additional possibility, depending on the circumstances of a respective OSP, is to 
negotiate preemptive license agreements with at least some copyright owners. This 
is becoming a practice of the major OSPs such as YouTube, Yahoo etc. In return for 
authorization to use copyrighted work in the original and in the derivative works of 
its users, OSPs can offer royalties, company’s shares or advertisement opportuni-
ties. Primary function of the agreements is to serve as a shield from liability suits 
for possible infringements of negotiated copyrights. Secondary function is to dem-
onstrate, in a possible suit, that the OSP recognizes that some of its users might be 
involved in infringing activity and puts its best efforts to decrease such activity. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Information in this paragraph are extracted from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Viacom 
v. YouTube. 
2 The Court lists that YouTube employees conducted web survey which showed that 75-80% of material 
uploaded on YouTube is infringing, and that Credit Suisse (financial advisor of Google) estimated that 
more then 60% of material uploaded on YouTube is infringing. (Viacom v. YouTube, 2012:633)
3 The amount Viacom requested as damages for the unauthorized use of its copyrighted material in its suit 
filed March 13, 2007. (Hormann, 2009:1357)
4 Rules on indirect liability for copyright infringement vary significantly in the international setting. More 
on the rules on indirect liability in international setting see Oswald, 2008:247.
5 Knowingly “does not simply mean “awareness of the infringement” but instead implies some meaningful 
capacity to prevent or discourage infringement.” (Lichtman and Landes, 2003:396)
6 An example of contributory infringement was the courts decision in the Elektra Records Co. v. Gem 
Electronic Distributors, Inc. case. A chain of stores sold blank tapes and loaned buyers tapes with copy-
righted musical works that the buyers could then copy by using a system provided for them in the stores. 
Because, the defendant supplied all the necessary means to infringe, the court held it liable for contribu-
tory infringement. (see more on contributory infringement in Leaffer, 2005:426)
7 The statutory definition requires that the material is uploaded “without modification to the content of the 
material as sent or received”. However, in recent decision involving Veoh Networks, which maintained an 
online service that allowed its users to share videos, the court has held that this language “is clearly meant 
to cover more then mere electronic storage lockers” (UMG Recordings v. Veoh Networks 2008:1081). In 
proceedings on the appeal on the decision, the court further explained that “the language and structure of 
the statute, as well as the legislative intent that motivated its enactment, clarify that § 512(c) encompasses 
the access-facilitating processes that automatically occur when a user uploads a video to Veoh” (UMG 
Recordings v. Shelter Capital Partners 2011:1032).
8 In Viacom Intern., Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d. Cir. 2012).
9 In Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2001.)
10 “Although the Act was not passed with Napster-type services in mind, the definition of Internet service 
provider is broad…Aimster fits it.” See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 651 (7th Cir. 2003) 
18
Medij. istraž. (god. 18, br. 2) 2012. (5-20)
11 The concept called “staple article of commerce” or the concept of “substantial non-infringing use” was 
borrowed from patent law, and used in a copyright case for the first time. (Henslee, 2011:613) 
12 See Lichtman and Landes, 2003:400; Henslee, 2011:615; Leaffer, 2005:427.
13 There are also arguments that secondary liability of the service providers should not be limited: “Second-
ary liability is perceived to be an effective enforcement vehicle for three main reasons. First, it can pro-
vide a more cost-effective mechanism for litigation in place of suing countless unknown direct infringers. 
Second, it can provide an effective compensation system for defendants through the deep pockets of sec-
ondary infringers. Third, it can utilize potential secondary infringers as gatekeepers against infringement 
by direct users.” (Helman, 2010:155)
14 “Mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough…to subject 
a distributor to liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribution, such as offering cus-
tomers technical support or product up-dates support liability themselves. The inducement rule, instead, 
premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise 
legitimate commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful purpose.” (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Stu-
dios v. Grokster, 2005:937)
15 For the explanations why the inducement rule from Grokster may cause confusion see Darrow and Fer-
rera, 2007:11; Kohler, 2012:488,489; Leaffer, 2005:431.
16 For an interesting theory that most of the courts’ decisions are based on whether the court essentially 
believes in the legitimacy and good faith of the OSP see Dogan, 2011:7. 
17 More on how Grokster illustrates this idea see Choi, 2006:399.
18 On the relation between Sony safe harbor and the DMCA safe harbor see Menell, P. and Nimmer, D. 
(2007:143-204).
19 Citing an article by David Kravets, titled “10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA IS the Law that Saved 
the Web” published on October 27, 2008 on www.wired.com where Kravets explains why the Internet 
innovations as well as the wealth of the major Internet companies would not be possible without the 
DMCA.
20 This, of course, does not mean that the OSP will necessarily be held liable. For example, an OSP might 
fall into the Sony “substantial non-infringing use” rule and be exempted of liability.
21 The statutory definition of an OSP provides that the OSP is “an entity offering the transmission, routing, 
or providing the connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by 
a user, or material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or 
received. 17 U.S.C. §512(k) (2006)
22 “YouTube will terminate a user’s access to the Service if, under appropriate circumstances, the user is 
determined to be a repeat infringer.” http://www.youtube.com/t/terms
23 §512(m)
24 §512(a); §512(b), §512(c); §512(d)
25 §512(c)(1) 
26 §§512(c)(1)(C); 512(i)(1)(A); 512(i)(1)(B); 512(i)(2). 
27 Google removes more then 1 million infringing links per month upon takedown notices. (Reported by 
David Kravets on http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/05/google-infringing-link-removal/)
28 Google has reported that more then half of the takedown notices it received have been from copyright 
holders targeting competitors, and of those 40% were invalid. (Black, 2011:767)
29 More on fair use see Leaffer 2005:469-514; Madison, 2004: 1525-1690.
30 §§512(c)(1)(A)(i); 512(c)(1)(A)(ii); 512(c)(1)(B).
19
What does Viacom v. YouTube decision from April 5, 2012 Change in the Online...
31 Class action is an institute of the American civil procedure which allows a representative to bring an ac-
tion on behalf of a group, and if all the conditions are met, the group is bound by the result of the litigation. 
More on class action see Freer, 2009:720-777. 
32 UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 667 F. 3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011), UMG Re-
cordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (C.D. Cal. 2008) etc.
33 For example: “…in a July 4, 2005 e-mail exchange, YouTube founder Chad Hurley sent an e-mail to his 
co-founders with the subject line “budlight commercials,” and stated, “we need to reject these too.” Steve 
Chen responded, “can we please leave these in a bit longer? another week or two can‘t hurt.” (Viacom v. 
YouTube, 2012:32)
20
Medij. istraž. (god. 18, br. 2) 2012. (5-20)
Što odluka u predmetu Viacom v. 
YouTube, donesena 5. travnja 2012. 
godine, mijenja u pogledu odgovornosti 
pružatelja internetskih usluga za 
povrede autorskih prava koje počine 
njihovi korisnici
SAŽETAK
Viacom je 2007. godine podnio tužbu protiv YouTube-a za izravnu i neizravnu 
povredu autorskih prava, te je tužbom tražio odštetu u iznosu većem od mili-
jardu dolara. Toj tužbi sud je pridružio tužbu koju je protiv Viacoma podnijela 
Football Association Premier League zajedno s mnogim filmskim studijima, 
televizijskim kućama i izdavačkim kućama, te je tako ovaj postupak postao 
masovna grupna tužba protiv jedne od najpopularnijih svjetskih web stranica. 
U Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama, takav tip web stranica najčešće spada u 
jednu od sudskih ili legislativno stvorenih tzv. “sigurnih luka”. Prvostupanjski 
sud odlučio je da YouTube potpada pod jednu od “sigurnih luka”, nakon čega 
je Viacom podnio žalbu. Drugostupanjska odluka donesena je 4. travnja 2012. 
godine. Iako je tom odlukom drugostupanjski sud vratio predmet prvostupan-
jskom sudu na odlučivanje, u odluci su dane naznake da YouTube ne bi trebao 
biti zaštićen “sigurnom lukom”. Neke strategije koje pružatelji internetskih us-
luga mogu provesti kako bi osigurali zaštitu “sigurnom lukom” mogu se sagle-
dati i promisliti u svjetlu ove nove odluke i postojeće sudske prakse. Nakon 
općeg uvoda u pitanje neizravne odgovornosti za povredu autorskih prava u 
SAD-u i činjenica slučaja u predmetu Viacom v. YouTube, ponuđene su ideje 
koje bi mogle pružateljima internetskih usluga pomoći da potpadnu pod “sig-
urnu luku”. 
Ključne riječi: pružatelj internetskih usluga, povreda autorskih prava, neizravna 
 odgovornost, Digital Millennium Copyright Act, sigurna luka, 
 Viacom v. YouTube 
